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To serve the domestic market, foreign multinationals often not only export there
but also control local ﬁrms through FDI. This paper examines the eﬀects of trade
and industrial policies on prices, outputs, proﬁts, and welfare when exports and FDI
coexist. Speciﬁcally, we focus on the case in which a foreign ﬁrm has full control of
al o c a lﬁrm through partial ownership. Cross-border ownership on the basis of both
ﬁnancial interests and corporate control leads to horizontal market-linkages through
which tariﬀs and production subsidies may harm a locally-owned ﬁrm but beneﬁta
foreign ﬁrm. Foreign ownership regulation beneﬁts a locally-owned ﬁrm.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Cross-border ownership (CBO) is wide spread in various forms in this age of globaliza-
tion.1 Often, foreign multinationals undertake foreign direct investment (FDI) in order
to control local ﬁrms. It is also common for FDI to coexist with exports, through which
foreign multinationals not only sell to the local market but also control local ﬁrms. A
typical example is the automobile industry. For instance, General Motors (GM), which
is the 100 percent shareholder of Opel in Germany and Saab in Sweden and a partial
shareholder of Daewoo in Korea and Suzuki in Japan and forms a joint venture (JV) in
China, also exports GM automobiles to those countries. In particular, all world leading
auto makers have been investing in China and simultaneously exporting there.2
Given this background, the present paper examines the eﬀects of trade and indus-
trial policies when exports and FDI coexist, in an oligopoly model of three ﬁrms. Two
domestic ﬁrms produce a homogeneous good and compete in the domestic market. A
foreign ﬁrm (partially) owns one of the domestic ﬁrms and also exports a diﬀerentiated
good to the domestic market. Incorporating control by the foreign ﬁrm over the domestic
ﬁrm into the analysis, we explore how outputs, proﬁts, consumer prices and welfare are
aﬀected when a certain policy is adopted, with particular emphasis on the impacts on
the independent rival ﬁrm.
As in the industrial organization and the antitrust literature (e.g., O’brien and Sa-
lop, 2000), we speciﬁcally distinguish between ﬁnancial interest and corporate control.3
Financial interest refers to the right to receive the stream of proﬁts generated by the ﬁrm
from its operations and investments. Corporate control refers to the right to make the
decisions that aﬀect the ﬁrm. In a sole proprietorship, a single economic agent has the
right to 100 percent of the proﬁts of the ﬁrm. The same agent also has complete con-
trol over the company, making the decisions about levels of prices, outputs, investments,
where to purchase inputs and locate plants, etc. In the case of partial ownership, no-
1From an index complied by Morgan Stanley Capital International, Wojcik (2002, table 1) documents
that 711 companies had foreign ownership in 16 northern and western European countries. The share
of foreign ownership varies with an average of 61 percent. The highest is Norway at 91 percent and the
lowest is Switzerland at 23 percent.
2The Chinese government does not allow fully owned foreign automakers. World-leading automakers
have been producing in China through joint ventures with local producers.
3Krugman and Obstfeld (2006, p.157) also state “The distinctive feature of direct foreign investment is
that it involves not only a transfer of resources but also the acquisition of control. That is, the subsidiary
does not simply have a ﬁnancial obligation to the parent company; it is part of the same organizational
structure.”
2body has 100 percent ownership. However, a principal shareholder may have 100 percent
corporate control. This is the case if a principal shareholder owns more than 50 percent
shares. As pointed out by O’brien and Salop (2000), however, it could arise even if the
ownership is less than 50 percent.4
Taking this into account, we focus on the case in which the foreign ﬁrm has full control
of a local ﬁrm through partial ownership.56We ﬁnd that CBO and corporate control
together enable the foreign multinational to shift production so as to evade the burden
or even take advantage of commercial policies such as import tariﬀs and local-production
subsidies. As a consequence, such policies may not beneﬁt ﬁrms that are 100% locally-
owned, and a tariﬀ could lower the prices, that is, the so-called “Metzler paradox” could
arise.7 However, regulating FDI may hurt locally-owned ﬁrms in terms of market share
and proﬁts under plausible conditions. These counter-intuitive eﬀects are the results of
“horizontal” market-linkages generated by CBO on the basis of both ﬁnancial interests
and corporate control.8 One might think that partial ownership is an insigniﬁcant matter
as long as the foreign multinational fully controls a local ﬁrm. However, we ﬁnd that the
o w n e r s h i pr a t i op l a y sak e yr o l ei ng e n e r a t i n gs u c hc o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v er e s u l t s .
Our analysis and results lead to important policy implications for countries intending
to develop local industries. Many developing countries adopt tariﬀs, tax holidays and
special economic zones to attract FDI. Markusen and Venables (1999) establish circum-
stances under which FDI is complementary to local industries, using a vertical production
structure. In the present paper, our structure is horizontal and we obtain contrasting
results. Speciﬁcally, if foreign ownership and control are not properly taken into account,
domestic ﬁrms could lose proﬁts and the government loses revenue. The ﬁndings in the
present paper complement the literature and we hope they can shed light and inspire
more research on trade and industrial policies in the presence of CBO.
There are a number of papers which analyze commercial policies under CBO in
4Krugman and Obstfeld (2006, p.157) also say “In U.S. statistics, a U.S. company is considered
foreign-controlled, ..., if 10 percent or more stock is held by a foreign company; the idea is that 10 is
enough to convey eﬀective control.”
5In the automobile industry, for example, GM owns 50.9% of GM Daewoo, Daimler owns 85% of
Mitsubishi Fuso, and Renault owns 70.1% of Renault Samsung. Renault also owns 44.4% of Nissan and
Renault’s CEO currently serves as Nissan’s CEO.
6In Ishikawa et al. (2004), we consider the foreign ﬁrm’s partial control over a domestic ﬁrm.
7Only a few studies explore the Metzler paradox under imperfect competition. See Panagariya (1982),
Benson and Hartigan (1983), and Ishikawa and Mukunoki (2008).
8For partial ownership between vertically related ﬁrms (i.e., suppliers and manufacturers), see Morita
(2001), for example.
3the framework of international oligopoly (see, Lee 1990; Weltzel 1995; and Long and
Soubeyran 2001). However, they abstract from issues of corporate control. Subsidiaries
only maximize their own proﬁts but ignore what the headquarters is doing and how the
headquarter interest is related to those of the subsidiaries. On the other hand, studies
such as Waltz (1991) and Ishikawa (1998) deal with full control under the coexistence of
exports and FDI, but subsidiaries are 100%-owned by their parent ﬁrms, and the parent
ﬁrm and its subsidiary produce a homogeneous good.9
Partial ownership arises due to various reasons such as government regulation, infor-
mation acquisition, risk aversion, and technology transfer.10 There has been extensive
discussion about what aﬀects ownership structures in the ﬁeld of organizational eco-
nomics.11 It is certainly interesting to analyze why and how partial CBO is formed.
However, our focus is rather on the eﬀects of trade and industrial policies. In particular,
we are concerned with horizontal market-linkages through these policies. Without the
coexistence of exports and FDI, the linkages would not arise.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model.
Section 3 investigates the eﬀects of import tariﬀs and production subsidies under foreign
ownership and control. Section 4 examines foreign ownership regulation. Section 5
explores the impact on national welfare. And section 6 concludes the paper.
2M o d e l s e t u p
Consider two goods X (say, large cars) and Y (say, small cars), which are imperfect
substitutes. Good X is made by a foreign ﬁrm f, that exports to the domestic market.
I nt h ed o m e s t i cc o u n t r y ,t h e r ea r et w oﬁrms d and h, that produce and sell good Y
locally. Let us denote the marginal cost of ﬁrm i as ci(i = f,d and h), which is constant.
Firm f holds ﬁrm d’s stocks, by a share k (0 <k≤ 1) which is exogenously given. The
cost of acquiring the share k is treated as a past sunk cost. This enables us to concentrate
9Head and Ries (2008) propose a model of FDI in which headquarters bid to control overseas assets.
They derive a gravity alike equation, which is used to estimate the model. They also use its parameters
to construct benchmarks for evaluating multilateral inward and outward FDI.
10In China, the upper limit of foreign ownership in the auto industry is 50 percent. GM and Toyota
established a joint venture, NUMMI, in California in 1984, because GM wanted to learn Toyota’s minicar
technology while Toyota wanted to establish its plant in the US using GM’s marketing network.
11Recently, contract theory such as the transaction costs approach and the property rights approach
is applied to examine the make-or-buy decisions of ﬁrms in “vertically” related markets. Spencer (2005)
and Helpman (2006) survey this trade literature.
4on the analysis given that ﬁrm f has already invested.
The domestic government imposes a speciﬁct a r i ﬀ t on the imported good X and
provides a speciﬁc subsidy s to the locally produced good Y . Based on the tariﬀ and
subsidy, the ﬁrms compete in the Cournot fashion. We assume for simplicity that a
change in the tariﬀ or subsidy does not aﬀect the ownership ratio, k.12
The inverse demands for the imperfectly substitutable goods X and Y are given
respectively as
px = a − x − γ(yd + yh), (1a)
py = b − (yd + yh) − γx, (1b)
where px and py are the prices of goods X and Y , 0 < γ < 1 is a parameter indicating
the degree of substitutability between the two goods, a and b are parameters, and x, yd
and yh are respectively the outputs of ﬁrms f, d and h.13 We deﬁne Y ≡ yd + yh.
Given the above structure, the proﬁt functions of ﬁrms f, d and h can be written
respectively as
πf =( px − cf − t)x + kπd = πx + kπd, (2a)
πd =( py − cd + s)yd, (2b)
πh =( py − ch + s)yh. (2c)
where πx is the proﬁt earned by selling good X, i.e., πx ≡ (px − cf − t)x.
In the following analysis, we speciﬁcally focus on the case in which ﬁrm f has 100
percent control of ﬁrm d and hence the objective function of ﬁrm d coincides with that
of ﬁrm f. That is, we assume
Assumption 1 ¯ k ≤ k ≤ 1,w h e r e¯ k denotes the minimum share under which ﬁrm f can
fully control ﬁrm d.
Firm d maximizes (2a) under full control by ﬁrm f,a n dﬁrms f and h maximize
their own proﬁts simultaneously and independently, giving rise to the following ﬁrst
12This is typically the case when a cap on foreign ownership is binding both before and after the change.
Even without the cap, the foreign ownership ratio does not usually change so often. For example, Renault
has been holding 44.4% of Nissan’s stock since 2002. Ford acquired 33.4% of Mazda in 1996 and the
ratio has not changed since then.













dyh = −yh + py − ch + s =0 , (3c)
where η ≡ 1/k ≥ 1 is an index of ﬁrm f’s control over ﬁrm d per ownership. Our model
nests the conventional framework without foreign control. By setting η =0 , the ﬁrst
order condition (3b) chooses yd that maximizes ﬁrm d’s own proﬁt. The necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for interior solutions are given in the appendix, which also proves
lemma 1 below, that is useful for the analysis to follow.
Lemma 1 The changes of ﬁrm proﬁts can be decomposed as:
dπd = yddY + γxηdyd, (4a)
dπx = kγyddx − x(γdY + dt), (4b)
dπf = −(γx + kyd)dyh + kydds − xdt. (4c)
3T a r i ﬀs and subsidies under foreign ownership and control
In this section, we analyze the eﬀects of the import tariﬀ i m p o s e do ng o o dX and the
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where the determinant of the above matrix ∆ ≡ 6 − (2 + k)γ2 − ηγ2(1 + 2k) > 0 is
required for stability.
63.1 Import tariﬀs




























Conditions (6a) and (6b) say respectively that an increase in the tariﬀ reduces the
output of the foreign ﬁrm f but increases that of domestic ﬁrm d, which are as expected.
However, noting ¯ k ≤ k ≤ 1,w eﬁnd a surprising result:
Proposition 1 An increase in the import tariﬀ on good X reduces ﬁrm h’s output if
and only if ¯ k ≤ k<1 but does not aﬀe c ti ti fa n do n l yi fk =1 .
While the original purpose of the tariﬀ is to help domestic ﬁrms, Proposition 1 says
that if the foreign multinational is tied up with a domestic ﬁrm, the other independent
domestic ﬁrm could lose market share due to the tariﬀ, contrary to conventional wisdom.
At a r i ﬀ on good X decreases the output of ﬁrm f but increases that of ﬁrm d.I fﬁrms f
and d are tied up by partial ownership, this eﬀect will be magniﬁed, because ﬁrm f tries
to recover the loss through the ownership of ﬁrm d. In short, corporate control enables
the foreign multinational to shift production to evade the burden of the import tariﬀ.
Now, whether or not yh increases depends on the scale of the production shifting
from x to yd. Proposition 1 implies that the increase in yd dominates the decrease in
x if k<1. This is because the production shifting is larger under partial ownership
than under full ownership. To see this, notice that under partial ownership, yd is chosen
smaller than the level maximizing the proﬁto fﬁrm d. In other words, an increase in yd
has a ﬁrst order positive eﬀect on the proﬁto fﬁrm d for given outputs of the other ﬁrms.
Therefore, when ﬁrm f recovers its loss by raising the proﬁto fﬁrm d, ﬁrm f expands
yd more under partial ownership than under full ownership. As a consequence, ﬁrm h’s
production, yh, is reduced under partial ownership. Note that if k =1 , yh is unaﬀected
because the two eﬀects from the changes in yd and x are canceled.


















From (7a), dpx/dt is negative if and only if ¯ k ≤ k<γ2/(3−2γ2). In addition, (7b) says
that dpy/dt is always non-positive. Thus, we have
Proposition 2 An increase in the tariﬀ (i) reduces the price of good Y if and only if
¯ k ≤ k<1; and (ii) also reduces the price of good X if and only if ¯ k ≤ k<γ2/(3−2γ2).
Proposition 2 is again surprising. Normally when the tariﬀ rises, imports decrease
while import prices rise, and the prices of substitutes also rise. However, Proposition
2 implies that both prices can fall following an increase in the import tariﬀ;t h a ti s ,
the Metzler paradox may arise. The intuition can be understood as follows. For (i),
conditions (6a) and (6d) state that dx/dt < 0 and dY/dt > 0. But due to the production
shifting of ﬁrm f,i fk is within the satisﬁed range, the eﬀect of dY/dt dominates dx/dt
in aﬀecting the price of good Y through equation (1b), lowering py.F o r(ii),s i n c et h e
two goods are substitutes, a large decrease in py also lowers px.






















Firm h’s proﬁt increases as its output rises. Invoking Proposition 1, the eﬀect of the
tariﬀ on ﬁrm h’s proﬁt is obvious. Since the tariﬀ increases ﬁrm d’s proﬁt but reduces the
proﬁt from selling good X,t h ec h a n g ei nﬁrm f’s total proﬁts is generally ambiguous.
The tariﬀ may beneﬁtt h ef o r e i g nﬁrm f, because the output of the locally-owned ﬁrm
h is reduced. Summarizing the above, we can obtain the following proposition, the
mathematical proof of which is contained in the appendix:
Proposition 3 Suppose that the import tariﬀ increases. Then ﬁrm h loses if and only
if ¯ k ≤ k<1, but is indiﬀerent if and only if k =1 .F i r mf gains if ¯ k ≤ k ≤ k1,w h e r e
k1 is deﬁned by γ2(k1 +1 ) ( k1 +2 )− 6k1 =0 ,b u tl o s e si fk =1 .
83.2 Production subsidy

































A surprising result is that dyh/ds in (8c) is negative if and only if ¯ k ≤ k<γ2/(2−γ2).
Therefore, the following proposition can be established.
Proposition 4 An increase in the production subsidy to good Y reduces the output of
ﬁrm h if and only if ¯ k ≤ k<γ2/(2 − γ2).
This interesting result again stems from the production shifting from x to yd due to
the multinational’s control power. Firm f tries to reap more beneﬁts from the production
subsidy by decreasing x and increasing yd.
It should be noted that with the subsidy, the range of k in which ﬁrm h reduces
its output becomes smaller than in the tariﬀ case. This is because the subsidy aﬀects
domestic production directly, while the tariﬀ does it indirectly by ﬁrst reducing imports.

















4 − γ2(2 + k + kη)
∆
= −
4 − γ2(3 + k)
∆
< 0. (9b)
These arise because the subsidy gives domestic ﬁrms incentives to increase outputs.






That is, the output of ﬁrm h decreases if and only if its proﬁt falls. From Lemma 1, the
production subsidy increases the proﬁto fﬁrm d, but decreases the proﬁtf r o ms e l l i n g

















The change in ﬁrm f’s total proﬁts is then generally ambiguous. However, the production
subsidy may beneﬁtt h ef o r e i g nﬁrm through two channels. One is ﬁrm f’s ﬁnancial
interest in ﬁrm d and the other is the reduction of ﬁrm h’s output. Speciﬁcally, we can
state the following proposition, the detailed proof of which is given in the appendix:
Proposition 5 If ¯ k ≤ k<γ2/(2−γ2) is satisﬁed, an increase in the production subsidy
to good Y reduces the proﬁto fﬁrm h b u tr a i s e st h a to fﬁrm f.
4 Regulated foreign ownership
In many developing countries, there exist legal limits on foreign ownership. Our model
can be used to analyze such a policy. We focus on the eﬀects on the outside agents, who
are not directly involved in the ownership, i.e., the consumer prices and the proﬁto fﬁrm
h.




2 γ(1 + k) γ























4.1 Eﬀects on the outside agents











γ2yd(η − 1) + η2γx
¡
2 − γ2 − kγ2¢
∆
< 0. (11)
Thus, we can state:
Proposition 6 An increase in ﬁrm f’s ownership share reduces the output and proﬁto f
ﬁrm h.
10When ﬁrm f has full control of ﬁrm d, an increase in foreign ownership enables the
two to become closer into one entity, thus hurting the rival ﬁrm h. Proposition 6 provides
interesting policy implications. If ﬁrm f has full control of ﬁrm d, then regulating foreign
ownership helps the locally-owned ﬁrm in terms of market share and proﬁts. Notice that
this protectionist role of foreign ownership regulation disappears without foreign control.
If ﬁrm d maximizes its own proﬁt, i.e., η =0 , then the sign of (11) is reversed.







Using Proposition 6, we obtain:
Lemma 2 An increase in ﬁrm f’s ownership share lowers the price of good Y .
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k − γ2} − γ2x{1 − k(2 − γ2)}
k∆
.
The sign is ambiguous if γ2/(3 − 2γ2) <k<1/(2 − γ2) holds. Since γ2/(3 − 2γ2) <
1/(2 − γ2),w eh a v e :
Lemma 3 An increase in ﬁrm f’s ownership share raises the price of good X if 1/(2−
γ2) ≤ k ≤ 1, but lowers it if k ≤ γ2/(3 − 2γ2).
In view of Lemmas 2 and 3, the following Proposition is immediate:
Proposition 7 Suppose that ﬁrm f’s ownership share rises. Then the prices of both
goods X and Y fall if ¯ k ≤ k ≤ γ2/(3 − 2γ2).
The intuition for Proposition 7 follows from Proposition 6. An increase in foreign
ownership strengthens the two ﬁrms as a single entity, enabling it to compete with ﬁrm
h by expanding output, thus lowering the price.
5W e l f a r e
In this section, we explore the welfare eﬀects of trade and industrial policies under FDI.
For computational simplicity, we assume the following on the ownership of the domestic
ﬁrms.
11Assumption 2 The residual share (1 − k) of ﬁrm d’s stocks and all of ﬁrm h’s stocks
are owned by domestic residents.
We deﬁn et h ed o m e s t i cw e l f a r eW as the sum of the consumer surplus, the domestic
ﬁrms’ proﬁts and the government revenue:
W ≡ U(x,Y ) − pxx − pyY + πh +( 1− k)πd + tx − sY,
where ∂U/∂x = px and ∂U/∂Y = py. Totally diﬀerentiating W yields:
dW = −{xdpx + kyddpy} + {(py − ch)dyh +( 1− k)(py − cd)dyd} (12)
+{tdx + xdt − k(sdyd + ydds)}.
The three brackets respectively express the terms of trade eﬀect, the resource allocation
eﬀect, and the revenue eﬀect.
5.1 Tariﬀ a n dp r o d u c t i o ns u b s i d y
We are now in a position to state the following proposition, the proof of which is given
in the appendix:
Proposition 8 Suppose that s =0and t =0hold initially. Then, (i) a small tariﬀ on
good X raises domestic welfare if (ch − cd) ≥ 0; and (ii) a small production subsidy to
good Y enhances domestic welfare if {k − γ2/(2 − γ2)}(ch − cd) ≤ 0.
Even though foreign ownership and control cause distortions to outputs, prices and
proﬁts, a small tariﬀ or a small production subsidy can shift rents and beneﬁt the do-
mestic country. If cd = ch,b o t ht h et a r i ﬀ and the production subsidy increase domestic
welfare, a la Brander and Spencer (1984). If cd 6= ch, on the other hand, it is not a simple
rent-shifting argument. Lahiri and Ono (1988) show in a closed economy that an increase
i nt h eo u t p u to ft h em o r ee ﬃcient ﬁrm and a decrease in the output of the less eﬃcient
ﬁrm can enhance welfare, and vice versa. Also Neary (1994) demonstrates that when
subsidies are justiﬁed, they should be given to the more eﬃcient rather than less eﬃcient
ﬁrms. In our model, this eﬀect also exists, in addition to the eﬀect of rent-shifting. For
example, the tariﬀ raises ﬁrm d’s output and does not increase ﬁrm h’s output when
¯ k ≤ k ≤ 1.I n t h i sc a s e ,i fﬁrm d is more eﬃcient than ﬁrm h (i.e., ch >c d), then the
tariﬀ improves welfare.
125.2 Foreign ownership regulation
We next examine the eﬀect of the foreign ownership regulation on the host country’s
welfare. To this end, we need to consider the stock market explicitly. Following Grossman
and Hart (1980) and Flath (1991), however, we simply assume a competitive stock price,
ρ = πd (where ρ is the price of ﬁrm d’s stock), under which the domestic stockholders
are indiﬀerent to sell or buy the stock. Thus, the domestic surplus from the sales of ﬁrm
d’s stock to ﬁrm f (i.e., (ρ − πd)dk) becomes zero.
Propositions 6 and 7 suggest that the welfare change is generally ambiguous because
the consumers and the locally-owned ﬁrm are aﬀected in opposite ways from an increase
in foreign ownership. When the prices of both goods fall, however, we ﬁnd that the gain
in the consumer surplus dominates the loss in the proﬁto ft h el o c a lﬁrm. Therefore, we
establish the following proposition which is proved in the appendix:
Proposition 9 Suppose that s = t =0and ρ = πd hold. An increase in foreign owner-
ship improves the domestic welfare if both ¯ k ≤ k ≤ γ2/(3 − 2γ2) and ch ≥ cd hold.
6 Concluding Remarks
In a model of cross-border partial ownership, we have investigated the eﬀects of com-
mercial policies (such as import tariﬀs, production subsidies and regulation on foreign
ownership) when exports and FDI coexist. Cross-border ownership on the basis of both
ﬁnancial interests and corporate control leads to horizontal market-linkages, such that
the commercial policies may not beneﬁt independent domestic ﬁrms, because the foreign
ﬁrm with corporate control is able to shift production and even take advantage of such
policies.
As is conjectured in Salant et al. (1983), CBO may not arise without some synergy
eﬀects such as technology transfer. Although it is not explicitly dealt with in our analysis,
one may think that technology transfer is reﬂected implicitly in the marginal costs in our
model.14 Also, since our main interest is in the eﬀects of trade and industrial policies
in the presence of partial CBO, we have treated the share of foreign ownership k as
exogenously given. This captures the feature of foreign ownership regulation which gives
rise to CBO. However, it would be interesting to analyze how such ownership structure is
formed and how commercial policies aﬀect them when they are endogenously determined.
14We explicitly analyze the issue of technology transfer under partial foreign ownership elsewhere
(Ishikawa et al., 2006).
13We have assumed that goods X and Y are produced in the two countries separately.
One could allow either country to produce both goods, but the mechanism of produc-
tion shifting under foreign ownership and control remains the same, and most of our
qualitative results should carry through. Also, we have focused on Cournot competition.
However, horizontal market-linkages are not unique to Cournot competition. Even under
Bertrand competition with diﬀerentiated goods, FDI could generate horizontal market-
linkages through which tariﬀs and production subsidies may not beneﬁtl o c a l l y - o w n e d
ﬁrms.
F i n a l l y ,t h ep r e s e n tp a p e rh a sf o c u s e do n l yo nh o r i z o n t a l l yr e l a t e dﬁrms. In the tradi-
tion of Markusen (2002) and Qiu and Spencer (2002), it is also interesting to investigate
vertically related ﬁrms. Our setup of cross-border ownership and control can be applied.
These remain fruitful avenues for future research.
Appendix
Interior solution. We provide the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for x and yd
to have interior solutions. The FOCs and the demand functions yield the equilibrium
outputs as
x =







− γ (2 + k)(A − γδ)
k∆
, (A2)
where A ≡ a − cf − t, B ≡ b − cd + s, δ ≡ cd − ch and ∆(> 0) is deﬁn e di n( 5 ) .
First, for a given k, (A1) and (A2) give rise to x>0 and yd > 0 i fa n do n l yi f
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(k +2 )> 0, there exist parameters (A,B,δ) for
an interior solution when k is given.15
Proof of Lemma 1. Totally diﬀerentiating πd, πx and πf and combining them with
15A little manipulation brings x =0if u(k) < γ(B−δ)/(A−γδ) and y
d =0if l(k) > γ(B−δ)/(A−γδ).
From the FOC for ﬁrm h, a non-negative δ assures y
h > 0 if y
d > 0.
14the ﬁrst order conditions above, we obtain
dπd = yd(dpy + ds)+( yd + γxη)dyd,
dπx = x(dpx − dt)+( x + kγyd)dx,
dπf = dπx + kdπd.
Diﬀerentiating ﬁrm h’s ﬁrst order condition and the demand functions, we obtain dpy +
ds = dyh, dpx = −dx − γdY,a n ddpy = −dY − γdx. Then we obtain (7a)-(7c).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3. From Lemma 2, the change of ﬁrm f’s proﬁti s
dπf
dt














Proposition 1 states that the ﬁrst term in (A4) is non-negative. Using (6c), the second








= γ2(k +1 ) ( k +2 )− 6k (A5)
is positive. The right hand side of (A5) is decreasing in k and is negative at k =1 .
Proof of Proposition 5. Using ﬁrm h’s ﬁrst order condition, dpy = dyh−ds,e q u a t i o n









The second term is always positive for k>0. Proposition 4 implies that the ﬁrst term
is non-negative if and only if ¯ k ≤ k ≤ γ2/(2 − γ2).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 . Expression (12) can be rewritten as
dW = x(dt − dpx)+( tdx − ksdyd)+dω,
where dω ≡− kyd(dpy +ds)+(py −ch)dyh +(1−k)(py −cd)dyd. Given s =0and t =0
initially, the second term becomes (tdx − ksdyd)=0 . Thus, it is suﬃcient to show that
(dt − dpx) and dω are both positive.





(3 − kγ2)+2 ηγ2 (1 + k)
∆
> 0.
15Therefore, (dt−dpx) > 0; that is, an increase in the producer price of good X caused by
at a r i ﬀ is less than the tariﬀ rate.
From the FOC for ﬁrm h,w ed e r i v edpy +ds−dyh =0 , and from that for ﬁrm d,w e
have py − cd = yd + ηγx.T h u sdω can be simpliﬁed as
dω = −kyddyh +( py − cd)(dY − kdyd)+( cd − ch)dyh
=( 1 − k)yddY + ηγx(dY − kdyd)+( cd − ch)dyh. (A7)
Because dY/dt > 0 in (6d) and dY/ds > 0 in (8d), the ﬁrst term in (A7) is positive. The





















Using Proposition 4, (cd −ch)(dyh/ds) ≥ 0 i fa n do n l yi f{k −γ2/(2−γ2)}(ch −cd) ≤ 0.
Similarly, from Proposition 1, (cd − ch)(dyh/dt) ≥ 0 i fa n do n l yi f(ch − cd) ≥ 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 . The FOC of ﬁrm f, dpx = dx + γkdyd + γyddk, and the
inverse demand, dpx = −dx − γdY, can be used to simplify the welfare decomposition
(12) as
dW = −x(1 + 2η)dpx + γηxdk +( 1− k)yddY − (ch − cd)dyh. (A8)




]/∆ > 0.M o r e o v e r ,dyh/dk < 0 if ¯ k ≤ k ≤ γ2/(3−
2γ2) (recall Proposition 7). Therefore, we obtain dW/dk > 0 if both ¯ k ≤ k ≤ γ2/(3−2γ2)
and ch − cd ≥ 0 hold.
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